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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT G. GARLAND and 
MARY GARLAND, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
FLOYD J. RIGBY, RAY HALL, 
RIMARAS, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, and 
ANNA R. FLEISCHMANN, 
Defendants-Appellant. 
JURISDICTION 
Notice of Appeal was filed with the Utah Supreme Court. This 
case was assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann., 78-2a-3(2)(h). The Court of 
Appeals ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs and affirmed the Judgment 
of the Trial Court and the Defendant, (Fleischmann) filed a 
Petition for Rehearing before the Court of Appeals, (which was 
denied) and then filed this Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Plaintiff filed suit to quiet title to a certain parcel 
of property located in Garfield County, State of Utah. The matter 
was tried to District Judge, Don V. Tibbs, who entered a Judgment 
in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants, Anna R. Fleischmann, 
Ray Hall and Rimaras, Inc. The Defendant, Anna R. Fleischmann 
appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the 
Certiorari Docket No.: 
Utah Ct. of Appeals No.: 
88-0707-CA 
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Trial Judge and denied Defendants Petition for Rehearing, 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL 
The issue presented by this writ follow: 
1. Did the Court of Appeals properly affirm the decision of 
the Trial Judge. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Fleischmann, gained a Judgment against the 
Defendant, Rimaras, Inc., and recorded said Judgment in Garfield 
County, State of Utah on the 8th day of July, 1985. The property 
had been purchased by the Plaintiffs in 1981 and Plaintiffs had 
placed a cabin on said property and had possession of said property 
and paid the taxes on said property to the time when the Defendant, 
Fleischmann caused a Sheriff's sale against said property on 
January 22, 1988. Prior to the Sheriff's sale the Defendant, 
Fleischmann was advised, through her agent, that the property had 
been sold to the Plaintiffs in 1981 and that Rimaras Inc., had no 
interest in said property. The Defendant, Fleischmann, made a bid 
on the property and caused a Sheriff's deed to be recorded. 
Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the Defendant Fleischmann and 
others to quiet title to the property in the Plaintiffs. The trial 
Judge found that the Defendant, Rimaras, Inc., did not have any 
interest in the property at the time of the Sheriff's sale and 
quieted title to the property in the Plaintiffs and against all of 
the Defendants. 
The Court of Appeals determined that the Judgment of the Trial 
Court should stand. The Defendant, Fleischmann then filed a 
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Petition for Rehearing which was denied and filed this Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT AGAINST CERTIORARI 
POINT I; The Petition for Writ of Certiorari was not filed 
within the time prescribed by Rule 45 of the Rules of the Supreme 
Court and the Petition should be refused by the Clerk of this 
Court. 
POINT II; The Court of Appeals has not made a decision which 
requires review under Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court and this Writ of Certiorari should not be granted. 
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI WAS NOT FILED WITHIN 
THE TIME PRESCRIBED BY RULE 45 OF THE RULES OF THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE PETITION SHOULD BE REFUSED BY THE 
CLERK OF THIS COURT. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NOT MADE A DECISION WHICH 
REQUIRES REVIEW UNDER RULE 43 OF THE RULES OF THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT AND THIS WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE 
GRANTED. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is attached hereto and 
sets forth the reasoning of the Court of Appeals and the cases 
decided by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah upon which the 
Court of Appeals relies. Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court set forth certain considerations governing review of 
Certiorari, none of which apply here. This case affirms the 
Judgment of a Trial Court concerning the theory of oral contract 
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and full performance and is based upon previous decisions of the 
Utah Supreme Court. This case does not render a decision that 
conflicts with a decision of another Court of Appeals panel nor 
does the decision decide an important question of municipal, state 
or federal law which has not been settled by the Utah Supreme 
Court, nor does the decision depart from the usual course of 
judicial proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
It is the position of the Plaintiff that Certiorari should not 
be granted because the decision of the Court of Appeals is not one 
which should be considered under Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. Also the decision of the Court of Appeals was filed 
on September 1, 1989 and the Order Denying the Petition for 
Rehearing was filed on October 11, 1989 and the Petition for 
Certiorari was not filed within thirty (30) days as required by 
Rule 45 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. 
DATED this p 7 day of - Q ^ <-*- ^  ^ ^ 1 9 ^ \ 
4 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on the day of Cc^ 
19 y] , a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, first 
class, postage prepaid to Patrick H. Fenton, Attorney At Law, 154 
North Main, P.O. Box 337, Cedar City, UT 84721-0337. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
P Pk 
Robert G. Garland and Mary 
Garland, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
Floyd J. Rigby, Ray Hall, 
Rimaras, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, and Anna R. 
Fleischmann, 
Defendants and Appellant. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISlbW1 Courl °' r^r^ 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 880707-CA 
Sixth District, Garfield County 
The Honorable Don V. Tibbs 
Attorneys Patrick H. Fenton, Cedar City, for Appellant 
Michael W. Park, Cedar City, for Respondents 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Orme. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Appellant Anna R. Fleischmann appeals from the trial 
court's order quieting title to a parcel of property referred 
to as lot 128 in respondents, Robert and Mary Garland. We 
affirm. 
Fleischmann does not challenge the trial court's findings 
of fact. Therefore, we review the court's decision under a 
correction-of-error standard according no deference to its 
legal conclusions. See, e.g., Taubert v. Roberts, 747 P.2d 
1046, 1048 (Utah 1987). Nonetheless, 
[s]ince this is an action at law, upon 
review, the findings and judgment of the 
trial court will be presumed valid, and the 
record will be reviewed in a light favorable 
to them. The appellant is required to 
sustain the burden of proving error, and the 
judgment of the trial court will not be 
disturbed if there be substantial evidence 
in the record to support it. 
Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Utah 1977) (footnote 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
Giving Fleischmann the benefit of the doubt, she claims 
the trial court erred in concluding, 1) the Garlands took the 
property by adverse possession, 2) Rimaras, Inc. had no legal 
interest in lot 128 in July 1985 when Fleischmann filed her 
judgment lien, and 3) Fleischmann did not acquire lot 128 as a 
result of the sheriff's sale. 
We first address Fleischmann1s adverse possession claim. 
We agree the trial court's order cannot be sustained under a 
theory of adverse possession. However, adverse possession was 
neither raised, argued, nor relied upon as the basis for the 
trial court's order. Following counsels' closing arguments, 
the trial court asked the Garlands' counsel, "how do you even 
get your basis for your title? You haven't even got it under 
adverse possession." Furthermore, the Garlands at no time 
suggested that they owned the property by virtue of adverse 
possession. Rather, the Garlands relied on, among other 
theories, the doctrine of oral agreement and full performance. 
Fleischmann's second and somewhat confusing claim is that 
no legal conveyance occurred between Rimaras, Inc. and the 
Garlands because a conveyance of title to the Garlands was not 
recorded prior to the date her judgment lien attached to the 
property. However, Utah law is clear—recordation is not a 
prerequisite to a valid conveyance of real estate as between 
the parties to the transaction. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 
(1986) (repealed by 1988 Utah Laws ch. 155, § 24); Gregerson v. 
Jensen, 669 P.2d 396, 398 (Utah 1983). "[A] conveyance of real 
property is valid and binding between parties, even without 
recordation." Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Beryl Baptist Church, 642 
P.2d 371, 373 (Utah 1982). See also Huntington City v. 
Peterson, 30 Utah 2d 408, 518 P.2d 1246, 1247-48 (1974) (title 
passed at date deed was delivered, notwithstanding no 
recordation). 
Moreover, Fleischmann is not entitled to the statutory 
protections accorded subsequent purchasers under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-3-3 (1989). It is clear that she had actual notice of the 
Garlands' purported interest in lot 128 prior to the sheriff's 
sale, thereby precluding Fleischmann from being a "good faith" 
purchaser under the statute. Accordingly, the resolution of 
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this dispute is not controlled by the recording statutes, Cf. 
Gregerson, 669 P.2d at 398. 
Utah law is also clear that a judgment lien attaches to 
the nonexempt real property of the debtor, but is "•subordinate 
and inferior to a deed which predate[s] it, whether recorded 
after such judgment or whether not recorded at all.'" Lach v. 
Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802, 804 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting 
Kartchner v. State Tax Comm'n, 4 Utah 2d 382, 294 P.2d 790, 791 
(1956)). We find no relevant distinction between property 
conveyed by deed or property conveyed by other legally valid 
methods. The foregoing rule of law applies with equal force to 
any effective conveyance of real property occurring before the 
date the judgment lien attaches. 
"[I]f the unrecorded conveyance was one 
which was made in good faith and for value, 
the lien would not attach, even though the 
judgment creditor had no knowledge or notice 
of it. By merely docketing his judgment, a 
judgment creditor parts with nothing, and 
does not become entitled to have the 
property of an innocent purchaser for value 
applied in satisfaction of a debt he does 
not owe." 
Wilson v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 280 Or. 45, 569 P.2d 609, 
611 (1977) (quoting Thompson v. Hendricks, 118 Or. 39, 245 P. 
724, 726-27 (1926)). 
Although the trial court's legal basis for quieting title 
in the Garlands rested on a theory of equity and fairness, 
which, without more, cannot be sustained, in the interest of 
judicial economy, this court "may affirm trial court decisions 
on any proper ground(s), despite the trial court's having 
assigned another reason for its ruling." Buehner Block Co. v. 
UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). See also Mel 
Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451, 
456 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, the narrow issue 
presented on appeal is whether the record supports a finding 
that Rimaras, Inc. had no ownership interest in lot 128 on or 
after the date Fleischmann's lien was docketed. 
At trial, the Garlands quiet title action rested in large 
part on a theory of oral agreement and part or full 
performance. Cf. Baldwin v. Vantage Corp., 676 P.2d 413, 417 
(Utah 1984); Legrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 26 Utah 2d 158, 
880707-CA 
486 P.2d 1040, 1041 (1971). After reviewing the record, 
including Mr, Garland's undisputed testimony, the pleadings, in 
which admissions of fact contained therein are treated as 
conclusive against the party making them, see Baldwin, 676 P.2d 
at 415, and Rimaras, Inc.'s post-trial stipulation, we conclude 
the evidence supports the Garlands' legal theory. 
Mr. Garland testified that the parties entered into an 
oral agreement to purchase lot 128. In reliance, Mr. Garland 
took possession and constructed a cabin on the property. In 
consideration for the property, Mr. Garland gave personal 
property to Hall and Rigby. Mr. Garland's undisputed affidavit 
stated that he paid the purchase price in full pursuant to the 
parties' agreement. 
In his answer to the Garlands' complaint, Floyd Rigby did 
not deny that the Garlands entered into an agreement with 
Rimaras, Inc. to purchase lot 128, and thus his failure to 
respond is deemed an admission. Ray Hall, in his answer, 
affirmatively asserted that he acted on behalf of Rimaras, Inc. 
during all relevant times to this action. Finally, Rimaras, 
Inc.'s post-trial stipulation disclaimed any interest in the 
property as of 1982, and affirmatively asserted that the 
Garlands were the owners of the property and entitled to 
possession as of that same year. Moreover, we treat the 
stipulation as binding between the parties in the absence of a 
legitimate challenge to the validity of the agreement. See 
generally Day v. Steele, 111 Utah 481, 184 P.2d 216, 220 
(1947). Although Fleischmann did challenge the stipulation 
generally, in the proceedings below, the trial court did not 
rule on the challenge nor does Fleischmann renew her challenges 
before this court. 
Accordingly, we find the evidence supports the Garlands' 
theory of oral contract and full performance, and thus, the 
trial court's conclusion that Rimaras, Inc. had no interest in 
the property either at the time the lien was docketed or at the 
time of the sheriff's sale. The order quieting title to lot 
J>8 in the Garlands is affirmed. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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BENCH, Judge (dissenting): 
I respectfully dissent. 
The majority's affirmance of the trial court's order seems 
to be based on the fact that Rimaras had no legal interest in 
lot 128 when Fleischmann filed her judgment lien. Record title 
clearly shows that Rimaras owned the property on that date. Any 
claim that the Garlands may have had to the disputed property 
derives from actions and promises by Hall and Rigby—not 
Rimaras. There is not even a claim that Hall and Rigby ever 
owned the property or that Rimaras is the alter ego of Hall and 
Rigby. My colleagues* decision suggests that a disclaimer of 
interest by record owner Rimaras can alter title to the 
disadvantage of judgment creditor Fleischmann. I believe that 
is contrary to law. 
I would reverse the "equitable" judgment of the trial court. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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